posts / European representative democracy and the far-right vote

European representative democracy and the far-right vote

25 Sept. 2026 — Germany's slate of elections for 2026 has now concluded, and the dust is starting to settle. European and national decision-makers should see their results for what they mean: too little representative democracy does not long go unpunished.

Germany's slate of elections for 2026 has now concluded, and the dust is starting to settle. In the meantime, pundits on both sides of the isle have provided all sorts of explanations for the votes that confirmed a feared trend: in Germany, but also in France with Marine Le Pen riding high, the far-right is at the gates, ready to seise power.

One issue has remained unaddressed: European voters' feeling of democratic dispossession.

Numerous explanations were provided for the AfD's result in Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern: immigration, the economy, the poor performance of centrist parties, deficient intra-party democratic practices, the centre-right's decision to cosy up to the far-right, the influence of MAGA figures, growing masculinist trends on social media, and even the role of women. All these explanations are somewhat valid, complement each other, and provide part of the explanation for the choices made by voters. I will not claim to bring forth a better explanation than other analysts have, but I do wish to highlight an issue that has remained unaddressed: European voters' feeling of democratic dispossession.

Recent years have produced a series of global threats that European member states are not equipped to deal with alone: the economic rise of China, leading to the offshoring of industrial production and an influx of imported goods; Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, leading to high gas prices and increased public expenditure for defence; a pandemic that, by definition, knows no borders; and a hostile United States, turning on its allies to impose tariffs and undermine laws aimed at protecting European citizens.

In the face of these threats, European member states have, more often than not, chosen the wise path of acting together. European institutions have acted to support industrial production in the Union, stem the tide of low-value packages from China, diversify fossil fuel sources, and coordinate the procurement of vaccines and military equipment. Further initiatives are underway to regulate the use of AI, create a harmonised corporate legal regime, strengthen our common defence, or build a capitals market union.

For citizens, these are more and more decisions taken by instances or officials they do not know and did not elect.

Welcome as those achievements and initiatives may be, their immediate result is an increase in decisions taken at EU level — either by European institutions or by member states themselves — further away from citizens. From citizens' perspective, these are more and more decisions taken by instances or officials they do not know and did not elect. And with such major decisions bound to impact one group or another, it is far too easy for extreme parties, on either side of the political spectrum, to blame Brussels for its lack of democracy and respect for "the people", as well as mainstream parties for "selling" their constituents. Farmers, industry workers, gas users, or motorists are among the many groups susceptible to buying into this necessity to "take back control".

Of course, it does not matter that elected heads of state or government are often the ones making the decision or choosing its political orientation, that the President of the Commission and commissioners are chosen by national governments, or that the European Parliament is directly elected. Citizens' lack of knowledge and awareness of European institutions and leaders lays the bed for this criticism. Hence the mention of a feeling of democratic dispossession.

In a democracy, citizens' feeling of representation is as important as their actual representation.

But in a democratic system, citizens' feeling of representation is as, or even more, important as their actual representation in the choice they make at the polling station. After all, democracy is about citizens choosing their leaders and the policies regimenting their life; once citizens are convinced decisions are not made by their leaders, it is easy for them to lose faith in their institutions. Such was the driving force behind the Brexit vote.

There are several complementary solutions to this problem, but with treaty change always an arduous process, the most straightforward one is merely to replicate what has worked at the national level to link citizens to their institutions: political parties. Parties are the means to create political programmes that go beyond individual endeavours and to formulate proposals matching a vision for society.

The EU has had European political parties since the late 70s; these were officially recognised and given a mandate in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, provided public funds in 2004, and granted legal personhood in 2017. Yet, despite over €650 million of taxpayers' money spent on European parties and their political foundations between 2004 and 2023, European parties remain invisible to citizens. Indeed, the representative side of politics has remained primarily a national affair, with national leaders and parties at the helm.

European parties and their individual members should have a central role in European politics.

Instead, we need European parties that citizens are familiar with, and with which they identify and vote for. A reform of European parties and elections must therefore put European parties squarely at the centre of European politics: individual members should have a central role in European party politics, and parties should court citizens for their votes and small donations across the continent. Above all, European parties should feature on the ballot of an election that goes far beyond a few transnational seats, and instead brings European parties' candidates close to citizens.

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Europe has a long tradition of diverse political parties, and the strengthening of European political parties will not happen by erasing national parties. However, just like building our Union meant transferring competences to European institutions, part of our representative democracy must be transferred to the European level. Avoiding this transformation of our political system, and hampering the emergence of Union-wide political platforms linking citizens to their common institutions, is the surest way to give fodder to the argument that the EU is intrinsically not democratic and must be either left behind or dismantled from within.

And, with five regional elections in Germany and another eight national elections in the EU in 2027, the far-right is not waiting.